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1 Introduction
Since the turn of the century, inequality has become one of the most promi-
nent political issues of our time. The World Economic Forums Global Risks
2013 report identified global income disparity as the global risk most likely to
manifest itself over the next ten years (World Economic Forum, 2013). Issues of
taxation and redistribution were central to the debate in the 2012 US presidential
election and in a number of recent general elections in Europe. In 2014, Thomas
Piketty (2014)s treatise on wealth and inequality reached the number one slot on
the New York Times Best Sellers List for best selling hardcover nonfiction.
There has recently been significant interest in the economic literature in the
level of, and trends in, various concepts of global inequality. The earliest of these
papers were predominantly focused on either within-country inequality, as in
Cornia and Kiiski (2001), or between-country inequality (see, for example, Fire-
baugh, 1999, 2003, Melchior, Telle and Wiig, 2000). Much of the impetus for
these studies came from concerns as to what impact the recent era of globalization
may have had on inequality (see for example, Richardson, 1995, Wood, 1995, Wil-
liamson, 1999, and also UNDP, 1999, which explicitly called for policies to miti-
gate rising inequality caused by economic globalization).
To quote Milanovic (2002:52), a direct implication of globalization is “that
national borders are becoming less important, and that every individual may, in
theory, be regarded simply as a citizen of the world.” The literature on global
inequality trends began to focus on estimating levels of global interpersonal
inequality. In this approach, the global distribution of income of all the citizens of
the world is constructed from national accounts and/or survey data.4 Inequality is
subsequently measured, based on this global interpersonal distribution of income.
Notable contributions in this area have been made by Korzeniewicz and Moran
(1997), Chotikapanich, Valenzuela and Rao (1997), Schultz (1998), Milanovic
(2002, 2005, 2012), Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), Bhalla (2002), Dowrick
and Akmal (2005), Sala-i-Martin (2006), and Atkinson and Brandolini (2010).
This study contributes to the body of literature on trends in global interperso-
nal inequality which, for convenience, we will refer to hereafter simply as global
inequality, in several respects: First, using the most recent version of UNU-
WIDERs World Income Inequality Database (WIID), we estimate global inequal-
ity levels and their trends during the period 1975–2010. Most of the aforemen-
tioned studies consider trends in global inequality only up to the mid 1990s. To the
best of our knowledge, this is one of the first comprehensive studies on global
inequality which spans the pre- and post-2008 financial crisis periods.
Second, this is one of the first studies that analyses global inequality using
not only relative inequality measures, but also absolute and centrist meas-
ures, with their very different properties and normative underpinnings. It has
long been accepted in the literature on social choice and welfare economics that
arguments for relative inequality measures vis-a-vis absolute or centrist
measures are firmly in the domain of normative economics. Amiel and Cowell
4Actually some studies have focused on income and others on consumption. We use the term
income loosely for now but will discuss some of the issues arising from the important distinction
between the two in Section 2.
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(1992, 1999a, 1999b), among others, have demonstrated in experimental work
that people have a range of views regarding how distributions should be ranked
with respect to inequality. Yet relative notions of inequality remain dominant in
the analysis of income distribution. In fact, there has been a paucity of empirical
studies within Economics that have employed absolute or centrist measures,
despite the fact that there is no economic theory that favours relative over abso-
lute notions of inequality. There are though signs that this is beginning to
change. A number of prominent studies, notably Ravallion (2003), Subramanian
and Jayaraj (2014), Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) and Bosmans et al. (2014),
have recently emphasised the importance of avoiding unnecessarily restricting
the discourse on inequality to relative inequality alone. The growing interna-
tional debate in political and popular fora about the rising gap between the rich
and the poor seems to support this view. We find that what emerges from the
evolution of inequality during the past 35 years using absolute, and even centrist
measures of inequality, is very different from the results obtained using standard
relative inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient or Coefficient of Varia-
tion. Our headline findings are that relative global inequality has declined stead-
ily and substantially over the decades, driven primarily by declining inequality
between countries. In contrast, absolute inequality, as captured by the Standard
Deviation and the Absolute Gini, has increased dramatically and unabated
throughout the period analysed. Like these absolute measures, our centrist
inequality indicators, the Krtscha measure and the intermediate Gini recently
advanced by Subramanian and Jayaraj (2013), also register a very pronounced
increase in inequality over the decades.
Third, the divergent nature of the trends in inequality obtained using relative
and absolute inequality measures poses some important questions and challenges
for policymakers. One such critical question is whether increased levels of inequal-
ity according to absolute and centrist measures are inevitable at todays per capita
income levels. We address this question by constructing counterfactual scenarios
of income distributions, in which all countries in the world have their actual 2010
per capital income, measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita,
but have Nordic levels of domestic inequality. When global inequality is re-
estimated for such counterfactual distributions, it turns out that absolute meas-
ures continue to register a very large increase in inequality. Further analysis, in
which inequality is decomposed into within- and between-country components,
confirms that at 2010s global and domestic income levels, the between-country
component alone of absolute inequality is higher than overall global absolute
inequality in 1975. Analogous analysis using centrist inequality measures suggests
that it is possible, if highly demanding, to match 1975 global inequality levels at
2010 income levels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss con-
cepts and challenges involved in measuring global inequality. In particular, we
discuss the relationship between global inequality and within-country and
between-country inequality. In Section 3 we discuss some theoretical aspects of
inequality measurement, with a particular focus on the different normative
underpinnings of relative, absolute and centrist inequality measures. In
Section 4 we describe the data and discuss some of the empirical challenges and
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techniques. We also formally describe a number of counterfactual analyses per-
formed in the study. In Section 5 we provide all our estimates of trends in global
inequality, for our different types of measures. We also provide the results for
our various counterfactual analyses. In Section 6 we do some sensitivity analysis
on our main results and discuss the robustness of our estimates. A concluding
discussion is offered in Section 7.
2 Concepts and Challenges in Global Interpersonal Inequality
Measurement
2.1 Within-Country, Between-Country, and Global Inequality
There are many reasons why one might have a concern for inequality and
wish to measure it. Perhaps the most obvious is that high levels of inequality may
be deemed to be socially unfair. Since the time of ancient societies, scholars have
been concerned about the possible negative effects of inequality on peace and
prosperity. In his dialogue with Adeimantus, and reproduced in Platos Republic
(1901:422), Socrates was aware of the pervasive effects of indiscriminate wealth in
deteriorating peace and order. Also, under the influence of Plato, Aristotle
(1954:1379a) saw in inequity a source of conflict and anger. In that context, the
state was seen as fundamental to ensuring peace and prosperity through the pro-
curement of justice and social equality (Plato, 1901).
Classical economists, from Adam Smith, and David Ricardo, to Karl Marx,
were concerned about the effects of unfair distribution of income on factors of
production, and social classes. These were, of course, discussions in the domain of
normative principles.
Others have argued for the significance of inequality of opportunity as an
obstacle for progress and development. Dworkin (1981a,b), for example, argued
that egalitarians should seek to equalize resources rather than outcomes. Roemer
(1993, 1998) introduced a model which separates the determinants of the welfare
outcomes a person experiences into circumstances and effort. He argued that indi-
viduals should only be held responsible for the latter. In contrast to effort, a per-
son has no choice with respect to the circumstances of the environment they are
born into. In Roemers framework, an equal-opportunity policy is an intervention
which levels the playing field by ensuring that equal outcomes in achievement
accrue to individuals who have expended the same amount of effort.
Some of the recent discussions on inequality are more obviously applicable to
domestic, within-country, inequality. However, as the world becomes increasingly
inter-connected, it is natural that relations between global inequality and global lev-
els of economic growth will become of interest. Both domestic and global inequal-
ity are important in these regards and this study is concerned with each of them.
Milanovic (2005) has provided a useful framework, subsequently extended by
Anand and Segal (2008), for distinguishing between different concepts of inequal-
ity.5 In this study we focus mainly on what Milanovic (2005) defines as Concept
three inequality. Concept three inequality is global interpersonal inequality (or
5This subsection follows the discussion in Anand and Segal (2008).
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global inequality), the inequality inherent in the actual global distribution of
income, of all the citizens of the world. We will also make some reference to
Concept two, which we refer to as between-country inequality. This is what the
inequality among all the individuals in the world would be if each person received
the average per capita income for his/her country.
We also consider the within-country component of global inequality, but
stop short of defining it as a new concept. This refers to the level of global inequal-
ity which is not attributable to between-country inequality. This is a more involved
concept than it might appear at first glance and, as discussed in Section 5.1 can
only be appropriately measured using a very specific class of inequality measures.
2.2 Income Inequality and Consumption Inequality
Thus far we have used the term income rather loosely. It is important to distin-
guish between income and consumption inequality. It is well-known that, in gen-
eral, income inequality is likely to be considerably higher than consumption
inequality. The reason is quite straightforward. The lowest quantiles of a distribution
based on consumption typically take a greater share of the consumption pie than
the corresponding quantiles of income do. In this study, we focus on income inequal-
ity but follow Deininger and Squire (1996) to make Gini coefficients based on
expenditure comparable with income Gini coefficients. In order to increase our sam-
ple of country-year observations, we do resort to using expenditure data in places,
but make adjustments. This procedure is described in Section 5. The measurement
of global inequality also requires an appropriate set of exchange rates to convert the
various national currencies into a common numeraire. The natural choice, and that
adopted in most of the literature, is to convert national currencies into purchasing
power parity (PPP). Therefore, we convert all domestic currencies into 2005 US$ at
PPP using the conversation factors described inWorld Bank (2008).
3 Inequality Measures
Of central importance to any study on inequality is the selection of the index
used to measure it. The choice of the index embodies fundamental normative
judgements that are important to be aware of when interpreting any results. One
especially important normative judgement regards the manner in which inequality
is deemed to change as economies grow and the size of the pie to be divided
increases. One approach is the so-called relative view of inequality, which deems
inequality to remain unchanged under equiproportional increases in income.
Measures which satisfy such a scale invariance property are known as relative
inequality measures. The overwhelming majority of empirical studies use meas-
ures, such as the Gini, Theil, and Mean Log Deviation, which fall into this cate-
gory. Yet such an approach is certainly not beyond criticism and can even be
considered quite an extreme position. In his seminal work, Kolm (1976) famously
described the relative inequality approach as “rightest.” The key critique is that a
strong case can also be made for attaching some importance to absolute differen-
ces in income. Consider a situation in which everyones income doubles. Many
might feel that if this change in the distribution means that the richest person can
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now buy two yachts rather than one, while the poorest can simply buy two chick-
ens instead of one, inequality has surely increased.
At the other end of the spectrum is the so-called absolute inequality
approach, of regarding inequality as being unaffected by an increase of the same
absolute amount to all incomes. Kolm (1976) described this approach as “leftist.”
The key criticism here is that no account is taken of relative income. Imagine a sit-
uation in which everyones income increases by $1m a year. Such measures say
that inequality has not changed; many might feel this is quite unreasonable, since
everyone is now a millionaire.6
To address the concerns with each of these rather extreme positions, a num-
ber of authors, notably including Kolm (1976), Moyes (1987), Bossert and Pfings-
ten (1990), and Krtscha (1994), have proposed centrist measures of inequality,
which take an intermediate position between these two extremes. Such measures
register an increase in inequality if all incomes increase equiproportionally, and a
decrease if the same absolute amount of income is added to all incomes. Experi-
mental evidence from Amiel and Cowell (1992, 1999a, 1999b) has given support
for diverse views as to how distributions should be ranked with respect to inequal-
ity, with support for relative, absolute, and centrist views. To account for
some diversity of judgements about how inequality should be measured, we thus
measure global inequality using a wide range of inequality measures - relative,
absolute and centrist.
A highly desirable property for any inequality measure, be it relative,
absolute, or centrist, is unit consistency. This property requires that the ranking
which an inequality index assigns to any member of a set of income distributions
is independent of the units in which income is measured. It would be most unsat-
isfactory, for example, if changing the denomination from, say, US dollars to Chi-
nese RNB would result in a different judgement as to which of two income
distributions were more unequal. While this requirement might not seem demand-
ing, it turns out, in fact, that a number of well-known absolute and centrist meas-
ures of inequality are not unit-consistent. As Zheng (2007) shows, neither the
centrist measures proposed by Kolm (1976), nor those of Bossert and Pfingsten
(1990), are unit consistent, though the Krtscha (1994) measure is. Intermediate
measures can range from being very close to being relative measures, to being
very close to being absolute measures. The Krtscha measure lies very close to the
middle of this range and might be described as being one of the most centrist of
centrist measures (Bosmans et al., 2014). This is another advantage for our pur-
poses, as our goal is to assess quite broadly how conclusions about global inequal-
ity trends are affected in moving along a spectrum from relative, to centrist, to
absolute inequality measures.
More precisely, the Krtscha (1994) measure is underpinned by the appealing
notion of a “fair compromise,” between relative and absolute inequality. The idea
6Note that Kolm (1976)s nomenclature in which relative measures are deemed to be “leftist” and
absolute ones “rightest” is reserved for a situation in which mean income is increasing. The interpreta-
tion is reversed in the context of declining mean income. Atkinson (1983, p. 6) illustrates this intuition
with a nice historical example; in 1931, sailors of the British Navys Atlantic Fleet at Invergordon
opposed a reduction in their pay of one shilling a day on the basis that “. . . they did not regard it as
fair that they should bear a bigger proportionate cut than the officers.”
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is that for inequality to remain unchanged while incomes grow, extra income
should be allocated among individuals in the following way. The first marginal
dollar should be distributed so that 50 cents go to the individuals in proportion to
their present income shares, while the other 50 cents are divided among individu-
als in equal absolute amounts. The second marginal dollar is distributed in the
same way, though using the income shares following the previous dollars distri-
bution as a starting point. As discussed by Del Rıo and Alonso-Villar (2008,
2010), a consequence of this approach is that, as mean incomes grow, this centrist
invariance concept becomes closer to the absolute invariance concept. While a
good case can be made for a “ray-invariance” principle, in which the same centrist
attitude is maintained no matter how much income increases (Del Rıo and
Alonso-Villar, 2010), there is some evidence from experimental studies that in fact
a changing attitude, as incomes rise, is a better description of how people actually
perceive inequality. Amiel and Cowell (1999a:78 Table 2), for example, found that
while the proportion of people who feel inequality is invariant to adding fixed
proportionate sums decreases somewhat as incomes rise, the proportion who feel
inequality is invariant to adding fixed absolute sums substantially increases.
The Krtscha measure (K) can be defined as follows:
K xð Þ5 1
nx
Xn
i51
xi2xð Þ2;(1)
where x is is the income distribution of a given country, xi measures the income of
a person i in a country of n population, and x measures the mean of the distribu-
tion x:
One way of thinking of this measure is as being equal to the variance divided
by the mean. Equivalently, and of particular interest here, as noted by Subrama-
nian and Jayaraj (2014), it can be expressed as the product of a well-known rela-
tive inequality measure, the coefficient of variation ðCVÞ, and a well-known
absolute measure, the standard deviation (SD). The standard deviation is also
unit consistent (Zheng 2007).
K xð Þ5CV xð Þ  SD xð Þ;(2)
where
CV xð Þ5 1
x
Xn
i51
xi2x2
 
n
" #1
2
;(3)
and
SD xð Þ5
Xn
i51
xi2x2
 
n
" #1
2
:(4)
Together, CV ;SD and K provide a family of inequality measures which,
while intimately related, make very different judgements regarding how growth in
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mean incomes must be divided in order for inequality to remain unchanged. We
employ this family of measures to estimate trends in global inequality, as judged
from very different normative standpoints.
We also employ a second family of measures, based on the Gini coefficient -
by far the most widely used measure of inequality. The Gini coefficient itself, a
relative measure, is often defined graphically, with respect to the Lorenz curve,
which depicts the cumulative share of, e.g., income or consumption expenditure,
corresponding to the cumulative population share. In a uniform, completely
equal, income distribution the corresponding Lorenz curve is a 45 degree line,
known as the line of equality. The Gini coefficient is the area which lies between
the line of equality and the actual Lorenz curve, divided by the total area under
the line of equality. More formally, without loss of generality, we assume to be
rank-ordered so that xi  xi11 for all i 2 1; . . . ; n21f g. Then the Gini coefficient
Gð Þ can be expressed as follows:
G xð Þ5 n11
n
2
2
n2x
Xn
i51
n112ið Þxi:(5)
The popularity of the Gini index is largely due to its attractive intuitive geo-
metric interpretation, taking values between 0 and 1, with 0 reflecting perfect
equality and 1, perfect inequality. A feature of the Gini coefficient is that it tends
to give greater weight to income transfers in the middle of the distribution than at
the tails; by contrast, the CV attaches equal weight to transfers at different
income levels (Atkinson, 1970).
Furthermore, the Absolute Gini AGð Þ is given by:
AG xð Þ5xG xð Þ;(6)
while various possible intermediate Gini coefficients can be entertained. We
use a version recently advanced by Subramanian and Jayaraj (2013), IG,
which is given simply by the product of the relative and absolute Gini
coefficients:
IG xð Þ5G xð Þ  xG xð Þ:(7)
Together, G; AG and IG provide a second family of inequality measures. The
relationships between its relative, absolute and intermediate members parallel
those between the corresponding members of our first family.
4 Data and Empirical Issues
4.1 Data Compilation
For analysis, we use the version (V3.0B) of UNU-WIDERs World Income
Inequality Database (WIID), which contains repeated cross-country information
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on Gini coefficients and income (or consumption) quantiles for 174 countries,
spanning the period 1970–2013.7 It is the most comprehensive and reliable dataset
of worldwide distributional data currently available.8
The focus in this study centres on six specific years - 1975, 1985, 1995, 2000,
2005 and 2010. The gaps since 1995 are shorter, mainly due to increased data
availability. In each of the years analysed, there is an inevitable trade-off between
using data as close as possible to the desired years, while maintaining as high a
coverage as possible of the global population at those times. The compromise
adopted was to choose these six years and to include observations within a maxi-
mum of five years of each data point - with a preference, naturally, for observa-
tions as close to each of these years as possible.9 So, for example, all country
observations for 1985 come from the 1980–1990 interval, but are concentrated
around 1985 as much as possible.
As well as favouring data close to the six specified years, all other things
being equal, we had a number of other preferences. Our inequality estimates are
ultimately built up from quantile share data. In order to obtain more precise esti-
mates, we had a preference for data based on deciles or, better still, the lower nine
deciles plus the top two vingtiles, rather than quintile shares. Since we study
global interpersonal inequality, we also had a preference for those data in which
the person, rather than the household, was the unit of analysis. Naturally, we pre-
ferred data based on surveys with a more representative coverage of the entire
population and those in which the quality of the data is deemed to be highest.
We had one final important preference. As highlighted in Section 2.2, our
focus is on global income (rather than expenditure) inequality. All other things
being equal, we used income data rather than expenditure data. Nevertheless,
ignoring the consumption based data completely would have dramatically
reduced the coverage of the desired countries and years. Where no suitable
income-based data were available but we had data on expenditure, we used the
expenditure data and adjusted it as described in subsection 4.2.
Before turning to the adjustment procedure, we note that when there was no
way to choose between more than one source for a given country-year based on
these criteria, we took an average of the quantile shares from these different sour-
ces. At the end of the process we were left with 55, 86, 122, 119, 135 and 107
country-year observations in 1975, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 respectively.
This provided us with a sample which covers 77% of the worlds population in
1975, 85% in 1985, 93% in 1995, 87% in 2000, 94% in 2005 and 83% in 2010. The
full list of country-year observations for each of the respective years, divided into
regional categories, and detailing regional coverage, is outlined in Tables B.1–B.7
in Appendix B.
7The WIID contains further data, dating as far back as 1867, but the focus in this study is on the
1970s onwards. The dataset is available on the following link: http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/
WIID3-0B/en_GB/database/
8For a review of the WIID, see Jenkins (2015).
9We regarded five years as an absolute cut-off in this respect. If there were only observations more
than five years from the desired country-year, these were not used. For the latter three years analysed,
observations more than three years from the desired country-year were not used.
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4.2 Converting Consumption Quantile Shares into Income Quantile Shares
Deininger and Squire (1996), in the context of their dataset, suggest adding
6.6 Gini points to Gini coefficients based on consumption to obtain the corre-
sponding income Gini coefficients. In this study, all our inequality estimates are
made directly using quantile share data. This clearly requires a different approach
to that of Deininger and Squire (1996), which can however be regarded as being
similar in spirit. We began by comparing the average quantile shares for income
with the corresponding quantile shares for consumption. However, in order to
ensure that we were comparing like with like as far as possible, we focused only
on those country-years for which there are income and consumption data in
exactly the same year. Where there was a choice of sources for a given country-
years income or consumption data, we had a preference for instances where the
sources for the income and consumption data where the same. This was done to
minimize differences due to other factors, such as different survey designs. The
average shares per decile for consumption and for income, and the average differ-
ences between them, are displayed in Table 1.
As expected, the lowest deciles for consumption have a higher share than the
corresponding deciles for income, while the highest decile for consumption has a
lower share than the highest decile for income. Where we had consumption-based
decile data for a given country-year, the shares were adjusted by the amounts indi-
cated in Table 1.10
4.3 Estimating Global Inequality Indices from Country Quantile Data
Thus far we have discussed the collation of income-based quantile share
data, at the country level, for each of the countries and years indicated. Estimat-
ing global inequality requires constructing a global distribution of income, using
these country-level quantile data. To do this, we need to consider both the num-
ber of individuals and the income per capita within each country. The number of
individuals per country were obtained from population data from a number of
sources.11 The income levels per capita were then calculated using GDP data.
TABLE 1
Converting’ Decile Quantile Shares to Income Quantile Shares
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mean consumption share (%) 2.45 3.67 4.68 5.60 6.69 7.89 9.49 11.67 15.69 32.17
Mean income share (%) 1.58 2.77 3.76 4.67 5.78 7.01 8.73 11.08 15.65 38.89
Adjustment (% points) 20.87 20.90 20.92 20.93 20.91 20.88 20.76 20.59 20.04 6.72
Note: Based on N5127 country-year observations with both income and consumption data.
Source: Authors, based on the World Income Inequality Database.
10In a few exceptional cases, where the adjustment took some of the bottom quantiles shares
below zero, these were instead simply taken to be zero and an equivalent subtraction taken from the
top quantile.
11The main sources were: (1) United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects,
(2) United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Report (various years), (3) Cen-
sus reports and other statistical publications from national statistical offices, (4) Eurostat:
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GDP for the various country-years, in 2005 US$ at PPP, were obtained from the
World Banks databank, with a few exceptions (see Appendix A).
A common approach in previous studies has been to make the simplifying
assumption that all individuals in the same country-quantile-year have the same
income. As Milanovic (2002) has discussed, there are some reasonable grounds
for taking this approach. Nevertheless, as is well recognized, the method should
be expected to bias the resulting inequality estimates downwards (see Anand and
Segal, 2008). Like Bhalla (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2006), though using a differ-
ent method, we constructed smooth within-country distributions, and based our
global inequality figures on these estimates. We used a technique developed by
Shorrocks and Wan (2009), which constructs a synthetic sample of observations
which conform exactly with the known quantile shares. In the first stage of the
method, a lognormal distribution is fitted to the reported quantile data and an
equal-weighted synthetic sample of 1,000 observations is generated. The resulting
sample is approximately consistent with the known quantile shares. The second
stage then adjusts the values of the observations within each quantile until the
quantile shares for the synthetic sample exactly match the actual quantile shares.
Formally, the synthetic global income distribution in year t can be denoted as
follows. Each country c 2 1; . . . ;Cf g in year t 2 t1; . . . tTf g has an income distribu-
tion xct 2 Rnct1 , where nct 2 N denotes its population at that time. Let Nt5RCc51nct
denote the global population size at time t. The global income distribution is then
given by a concatenation of all domestic distributions at this time, as follows:
xwt 2 RNt1 5
x1t
x2t

xCt
2
666664
3
777775:
Shorrocks and Wan (2009) find that while some other functional forms tend
to provide a better initial fit to income distributions, particularly in the upper tail,
the second stage procedure improves the accuracy of the lognormal based sample
so much that the outcome is as good as, or better then, leading alternatives.
For each of our years of analysis, this smoothing method was applied sepa-
rately to each country. This provided us with a sample of 1,000 synthetic
TABLE 2
Global Inequality Estimates
Inequality Measure 1975 1985 1995 2000 2005 2010
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 1.899 1.825 1.904 2.006 1.889 1.650
Standard Deviation (SD) 10183.830 11495.290 13833.720 15594.970 16957.500 17518.230
Krtscha (K) 19341.639 20976.605 26337.051 31281.327 32036.279 28901.751
Gini (G) 0.739 0.708 0.705 0.697 0.680 0.631
Absolute Gini (AG) 3964.290 4459.022 5121.878 5416.492 6108.163 6702.923
Intermediate Gini (IG) 2931.276 3157.389 3610.207 3773.670 4156.544 4232.225
Source: Authors, based on the World Income Inequality Database.
Demographic Statistics, (5) Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography Pro-
gramme, and (6) U.S. Census Bureau: International Database.
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individual income-share observations for each country, which were consistent
with the reported income shares (or those estimated based on expenditure shares).
These shares were then scaled up by the countrys mean GDP (in 2005 US$ at
PPP), weighted by the countrys population size, and merged into a single syn-
thetic global income distribution, upon which our global inequality estimates are
based.
A note of caution is in order here. We would have preferred to use mean income
data derived from the same household surveys upon which the quantile data in the
WIID were calculated. Unfortunately, given that there were many missing observa-
tions for the country-year mean incomes of interest, we chose to use GDP per capita
instead. Our choice, however, does not come without a cost. If the GDP data are
biased upwards (or downwards) for low income countries, or downwards (or
upwards) for high income countries, measured global inequality will be biased
downwards (or upwards), due to the resulting impact on the between-country com-
ponent of global inequality. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what the direction of
the net bias due to this measurement error should be expected to be, let alone its
size. It is fair to say though that a similar uncertainty would have also arisen from
the use of mean incomes from survey data. As Anand and Segal (2008) have pointed
out, household surveys are likely to suffer from underreporting of the incomes of
the rich and from undersampling of both the richest and the poorest. These dynam-
ics would be expected to bias domestic inequality downwards, but with uncertain
implications for the direction of bias in global inequality estimates, as the net effect
of this undersampling on the between-country component of inequality is unclear.
4.4 Estimating Counterfactual Global Inequality Indices
As mentioned in the introduction, we explore two counterfactual scenarios. With-
out loss of generality, it will be helpful in what follows to refer to Sweden as country 1,
and Iceland as country 2. Since we focus on analysing six particular years, we also
have that T5 6; t151975; t251985; t351995; t452000; t552005 and t652010.
Counterfactual Scenarios:
In counterfactual scenario 1 (CF1), all countries are assumed to have their
actual incomes per capita and population sizes in 2010. However, we suppose that
instead of their actual domestic distributions of income, all countries have the same
quantile shares as those of Sweden in 2010. Counterfactual scenario 2 (CF2) is
essentially the same as counterfactual 1, except that all countries are assumed to
have the same quantile shares as those of Iceland in 2010. The two Nordic countries
have had historically two of the lowest relative income inequalities in the world,
reflecting very unique social and economic models of redistribution. More specifi-
cally, the two counterfactual scenarios consider the hypothetical situation in which
all the countries in the world had arrived at social contracts that favoured welfare
regimes and redistributive systems of the type of these Nordic nations. Formally,
this amounts to estimating the inequality of the counterfactual distribution given by
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_xwt6 2 R
Nt6
1 5
_x1t6
_x2t6

_xCt6
2
666664
3
777775;
where, for c 2 1; . . . ;Cf g; _xct6 2 R
nct6
1 is a counterfactual income distribution with
the same same mean as xct6 but the same quantile shares as x1t6. Our results are
discussed in the next section.
5 Results and Analysis
In this section we provide global inequality estimates for 1975 to 2010, using
the chosen relative, absolute and centrist measures. The overall findings are sum-
marized in Table 2.
The results indicate that relative global inequality fell during 1975 to 2010,
from 0.739 to 0.631 according to the Gini coefficient, and from 1.899 to 1.650
according to the Coefficient of Variation. However, while this decline occurred
fairly steadily over this time period according to the Gini coefficient, the pattern
is much less clear with the Coefficient of Variation, which increased from 1985 to
2000, when it reached its peak.
In sharp contrast, global inequality has increased, steadily and substantially,
during 1975 to 2010 according to both absolute measures. The standard deviation
increased from 10,184 to 17,518, and the Absolute Gini from 3,964 to 6,702.
Global inequality also increased substantially according to the two centrist meas-
ures; from 19,342 to 28,902 according to the Krtscha, and from 2,931 to 4,232
according to our Intermediate Gini. The latter measure increased steadily, while
the Krtscha considers inequality to have increased in each period analysed up
until 2005, but, having increased at a rather slower rate between 2000 and 2005,
to have then decreased markedly between 2005 and 2010. Nevertheless, the
Krtscha still regards global inequality in 2010 as being at a higher level than at
any period prior to 2000.
5.1 Are Increased Absolute and Centrist Levels of Inequality Inevitable at 2010
GDP Levels?
Could a different world income distribution have evolved, with the same
GDP per capita as today, but in which absolute or centrist indicators of inequality
registered no increase? At a purely arithmetic level, abstracting from issues of
political economy or how growth is achieved, the answer is yes. As Roope (2015)
demonstrates, incremental growth is necessarily inequality reducing providing it
always occurs below some “critical point.” In the case of the Absolute Gini, for
example, this critical point is the median individual.12 If incremental growth
12Incremental growth in Roope (2015)s framework means that an increment e > 0 is added to
the income of some individual i 2 1;   ; nf g, while the incomes of all individuals j 2 1;   ; nf g 0 if g
remain unchanged. Thus, for example, incremental growth which occurs below the median refers to a
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always occurs below the median, it will always reduce inequality according to the
Absolute Gini. Eventually, following a maximin approach, everyone up to and
including the individual ranked one place above the median individual would
have the same income, and inequality thus far would have declined with growth.
Once this happens however, any further incremental growth must go (at best) to
the individual i5 n132 ranked immediately above the median, and this will now
increase inequality. However, starting again with the bottom individual, and
bringing everyone below i up to is income level, inequality will decrease once
again. The eventual end result of such a process would be to bring the whole
world to the same income level, at which point the absolute Gini would register
zero inequality. A similar, if slightly more involved, analysis can be entertained
for other inequality measures.
Growth of any magnitude, together with falling absolute inequality, is techni-
cally possible. In practice, of course, there will be all sorts of obstacles to such a
process. From a political economy perspective, it is rather unclear whether soci-
eties would favor redistribution that augments incomes below the median. Since
the pioneering work of Frohlich et al. (1987a,b), and Frohlich and Oppenheimer
(1992), experimental studies in the area of political philosophy and redistributive
justice have found that perceptions of fairness do not always favor Rawls (1971)s
maximin principle. Indeed, these earlier studies find that under certain conditions
individuals seem more utilitarian, favoring efficient distributions over those that
maximize the income of the worst-off.
Perceptions of fairness also seem to be associated with individual characteris-
tics such as sex and race (Michelbach et al., 2003), context and education (Fara-
velli 2007), individual preferences (Traub et al., 2005), and cultural differences
(Bond and Park, 1991).
From a growth perspective, one important constraint to consider is
whether such an outcome, i.e. growth in incomes with falling absolute inequal-
ity, is achievable without imposing limits on growth in specific countries. In
particular, for example, could absolute and centrist notions of inequality have
matched 1975 levels in 2010 in a context where individual countries grew
domestically at their actual rates, albeit with possibly quite different domestic
distributions of income? Or, to put it another way, at 2010s overall global
GDP level, could absolute or centrist notions of global inequality have
remained at 1975 levels without even greater convergence among countries
than that which actually occurred?
The Nordic countries stand out as being high income countries with com-
paratively low levels of relative inequality. Arguably, for many countries,
achieving todays income per capita levels, or even higher, while emulating Nor-
dic levels of relative inequality, would have been a very considerable achieve-
ment. What would our absolute and centrist measures of inequality say about
global inequality in 2010 in such a scenario? Would it still be higher than in
1975? In the counterfactual scenarios 1 and 2, all countries are assumed to
have their actual incomes per capita in 2010, but their quantile shares -and
situation where an increment e > 0 is added to the income of an individual i < n11ð Þ=2 while the
incomes of all individuals j 2 1;   ; nf g 0 if g remain unchanged.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 63, Number 4, December 2017
VC 2016 UNU-WIDER
674
therefore domestic relative inequality levels- are the same as those of Sweden
and Iceland in 2010, respectively.13
The results of the counterfactual scenarios are displayed in Table 3, which
also includes, for comparison, the corresponding relative inequality estimates.
As expected, both relative inequality measures register a very substantial
decline in inequality in such scenarios, with inequality far below actual 2010 lev-
els. The situation is, however, very different for the two absolute inequality meas-
ures; both the Standard Deviation and the Absolute Gini increase very
substantially under both counterfactual scenarios. Thus, even worldwide domestic
achievement of Nordic levels of relative inequality would not be enough to keep
global absolute inequality at 1975 levels given 2010s global and domestic GDP
levels. Turning to our centrist measures, like the absolute measures, the Intermedi-
ate Gini registers a very steep increase in inequality under both counterfactual
scenarios. In contrast, the Krtscha registers a decrease under CF1, and a very
slight increase under CF2. These results suggest that given actual levels of GDP
per capita in 2010, Icelandic relative inequality levels are loosely speaking, an
approximate upper bound to the domestic relative inequality levels that would be
required globally to reduce the Krtscha to its 1975 level. As with absolute meas-
ures though, Nordic domestic relative inequality levels would not be sufficient for
the Intermediate Gini to equal its 1975 level in 2010.
A natural question is whether it is possible to achieve levels of global interme-
diate and absolute inequality as they were in 1975 with todays domestic and
global income levels. To shed light on this, we re-estimate our results in a further
counterfactual scenario in which all individuals in each country assume their
countrys GDP per capita income, so that domestic inequality is completely elimi-
nated. This is equivalent to the ultimate result of repeated application of a maxi-
min approach, as discussed above. The results are displayed in the final column of
Table 3. Even in this extreme scenario, both the Standard Deviation and the
TABLE 3
Counterfactual Scenarios: Global Inequality Levels Assuming Actual Growth in per cap-
ita Income Globally but Domestic Income Shares at 2010 Swedish / Icelandic Levels
Inequality Measure 1975
2010 Counterfac-
tual 1– Swedish
quantile shares
2010 Counterfac-
tual 2– Icelandic
quantile shares
2010 Counterfac-
tual 3 – Zero
domestic inequality
Absolute measures
Standard Deviation 10183.830 13898.230 14483.090 11860.9
Absolute Gini 3964.290 6043.034 6092.717 5568.693
Centrist measures
Krtscha 19341.639 18191.254 19754.500 13248.863
Intermediate Gini 2931.276 3439.937 3496.732 2920.445
Relative measures
Gini 0.739 0.569 0.574 0.524
Coeff. of Variation 1.899 1.309 1.364 1.117
Source: Authors, based on the World Income Inequality Database.
13Sweden had the fourth lowest Gini coefficient in our sample of countries in both 1975 and 2010
and was virtually unchanged, from 0.239 in 1975 to 0.241 in 2010. In 2010, Iceland had a Gini coeffi-
cient of 0.256, the eighth lowest in the world according to our estimates.
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Absolute Gini would be well above 1975 levels, while even the Intermediate Gini is
just very marginally lower than in 1975. The Krtscha, in contrast, and as expected
in light of the previous counterfactuals, is estimated to be very substantially below
1975 levels in this scenario. These results suggest that for each of these measures,
apart from the Krtscha, it is probably impossible to emulate 1975 global inequality
levels, without further economic convergence, or a decline in between country
inequality. There is, however, an important technical caveat to this.
A feature which can be very useful, in certain contexts, for inequality meas-
ures to satisfy, is sub-group decomposability (see Shorrocks, 1984). An inequality
measure with this property can be decomposed exactly into a within-group compo-
nent, and a between-group component. Unfortunately, not all inequality measures
satisfy this property. In fact, as Zheng (2007) demonstrated, the only known abso-
lute and centrist inequality measures which are both decomposable and unit-
consistent are, respectively, the Variance (which is simply the square of our SD
measure) and the Krtscha (or, more precisely, a class of measures which generalise
the Krtscha). The implications of this for the results in the final column of Table 3
are that, in the case of the Standard Deviation, Absolute Gini and Intermediate
Gini, minimising domestic inequality levels (holding domestic GDP constant)
might not actually yield the minimum possible overall global inequality levels, as
these indices are not subgroup consistent. Thus, to test for further confirmation
that lack of sufficient convergence alone is enough to ensure that absolute inequal-
ity in 2010 is higher than in 1975, in Table 4 we decompose the Variance into its
within-country and between country components, for each of these two years.
The analysis confirms that the between-country component alone of absolute
inequality in 2010, according to the Variance, is substantially higher than overall
global absolute inequality in 1975. Table 4 also provides a corresponding decom-
position for the Krtscha, and for the Mean Log Deviation, the latter, an impor-
tant member of the Generalized Entropy Class of measures, which are the only
additively decomposable relative inequality measures (Shorrocks, 1984). The
results show that the between-country component of the Krtscha in 2010 is less
than that of the overall global Krtscha measure in 1975. In contrast to both the
TABLE 4
Decomposing Global Inequality 1975 & 2010
Inequality Measure 1975 2010
Absolute inequality
Variance 103,710,000 306,888,000
Variance: Within-country 48,727,000 166,207,000
Variance: Between-country 54,984,000 140,681,000
Centrist inequality
Krtscha 19,341.64 28,901.75
Krtscha: Within-country 9,087.38 15,652.89
Krtscha: Between-country 10,254.26 13,248.86
Relative inequality
MLD 1.349 0.805
MLD: Within-country 0.262 0.297
MLD: Between-country 1.087 0.507
Source: Authors, based on the World Income Inequality Database.
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Variance and the Krtscha, the relative Mean Log Deviation regards between-
country inequality to be dramatically lower in 2010 than in 1975 and, in fact, this
is the sole reason this measure deems global inequality overall to have declined
over the period, since its within-country component actually increased.
TABLE 5
Global Inequality Estimates
Inequality Measure 1975 1985 1995 2000 2005 2010
East Asia & Pacific
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 2.644 2.235 1.990 1.703 1.664 1.326
Standard Deviation (SD) 5395.897 3468.993 9200.877 5653.267 11068.690 11822.960
Krtscha (K) 14266.644 7753.997 18307.721 9628.475 18421.067 15681.265
Gini (G) 0.761 0.557 0.679 0.509 0.582 0.514
Absolute Gini (AG) 1552.557 864.861 3137.612 1689.899 3873.928 4582.664
Intermediate Gini (IG) 1181.108 481.961 2128.995 860.361 2256.447 2355.947
Europe & Central Asia
East Asia & Pacific
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 0.685 0.790 1.990 1.703 0.966 0.840
Standard Deviation (SD) 11297.730 11819.460 15729.890 17689.140 19140.670 18040.570
Krtscha (K) 7743.125 9334.537 16090.891 18048.583 18491.418 15146.863
Gini (G) 0.328 0.381 0.499 0.494 0.461 0.418
Absolute Gini (AG) 5412.429 5707.365 7666.690 8565.410 9143.340 8987.439
Intermediate Gini (IG) 1777.117 2176.561 3822.458 4231.826 4219.560 3759.176
Latin America & Caribb
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 1.503 1.412 1.565 1.600 1.446 1.307
Standard Deviation (SD) 10799.290 10427.910 12584.000 13395.960 13055.440 13578.710
Krtscha (K) 16228.309 14722.019 19697.358 21434.072 18871.769 17749.139
Gini (G) 0.563 0.542 0.567 0.577 0.544 0.512
Absolute Gini (AG) 4049.009 4000.509 4561.950 4832.972 4912.611 5313.855
Intermediate Gini (IG) 2281.293 2166.715 2588.633 2789.881 2672.116 2718.196
Middle East & N. Africa
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 2.078 1.252 1.307 1.243 1.184 0.863
Standard Deviation (SD) 10151.900 7741.818 6482.113 6967.308 6929.870 4738.835
Krtscha (K) 21094.735 9692.137 8474.066 8663.778 8204.481 4091.084
Gini (G) 0.656 0.519 0.529 0.476 0.469 0.381
Absolute Gini (AG) 3203.705 3210.280 2621.505 2668.319 2743.021 2090.486
Intermediate Gini (IG) 2100.798 1666.553 1385.990 1270.734 1285.462 796.141
North America
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 0.678 0.718 0.789 0.841 0.866 0.872
Standard Deviation (SD) 15359.110 20763.050 27117.510 33750.230 37573.760 37574.880
Krtscha (K) 10412.248 14913.684 21387.038 28385.968 32530.986 32772.435
Gini (G) 0.337 0.362 0.384 0.393 0.399 0.412
Absolute Gini (AG) 7632.694 10462.433 13208.108 15757.475 17312.952 17754.628
Intermediate Gini (IG) 2571.378 3786.773 5073.763 6187.645 6906.656 7317.037
South Asia
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 0.944 0.859 0.829 1.114 1.306 1.038
Standard Deviation (SD) 803.623 883.320 1155.274 1876.087 2680.569 2910.322
Krtscha (K) 758.765 758.533 957.272 2089.323 3502.003 3020.012
Gini (G) 0.406 0.350 0.347 0.433 0.509 0.430
Absolute Gini (AG) 345.817 359.662 484.260 730.265 1044.784 1206.038
Intermediate Gini (IG) 140.505 125.756 168.198 316.563 532.004 518.620
Sub-Saharan Africa
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 1.406 1.666 3.325 2.705 3.247 3.143
Standard Deviation (SD) 2337.863 1770.683 5288.443 5021.646 5574.384 7627.560
Krtscha (K) 3287.082 2950.808 17585.289 13582.448 18098.074 23972.658
Gini (G) 0.541 0.547 0.685 0.675 0.631 0.633
Absolute Gini (AG) 898.915 581.416 1090.042 1252.412 1083.352 1535.171
Intermediate Gini (IG) 485.971 318.151 747.104 844.852 683.563 971.088
Source: Authors, based on the World Income Inequality Database.
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5.2 Regional Inequality Trends
While a detailed analysis of regional inequality patterns is beyond the scope
of this paper, it is of interest, in passing, to highlight some broad trends. Inequal-
ity estimates for 1975 to 2010, using each of our two families of measures, are
summarized in Table 5.
The results indicate substantially different trends in inequality across regions
during the period analysed. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to global
inequality, at a regional level, relative and absolute inequality measures often con-
cur on the direction of change of inequality. Inequality increased substantially
and steadily throughout 1975–2010 in North America, which for present purposes
does not include Mexico, according to all measures. Inequality also increased
according to all measures in Europe and Central Asia, South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, though with some ups and downs along the way according to rel-
ative measures. In the case of Europe and Central Asia, inequality peaked in 1995
according to relative measures and has since been in decline. All measures agree
that inequality fell in this region during 2005–2010. All measures are also in
agreement that inequality in the Middle East and North Africa decreased sub-
stantially over the period. Inequality rose overall during 1975–2010 in Latin
America and the Caribbean according to absolute and centrist measures, but fell
according to relative measures.14 All measures show that inequality rose in the
region during 1975–2000, while only the absolute measures registered an increase
in inequality during 2000–2010. In East Asia and Pacific, inequality fell overall
according to relative measures, but increased according to absolute and centrist
measures. Even there though there is some agreement between different concepts
of inequality: all measures regard inequality as having fallen during 1975–1985,
and during 1995–2000. All measures except the Coefficient of Variation deem
inequality to have risen during both 1985–1995 and 2000–2005.
It should also be noted that within regions, there is typically considerable
variation with respect to levels of, and changes in, domestic inequality over the
period of analysis. For example, in Europe, the UKs Gini has increased by 38%,
while Frances has fallen by 16%; in Latin America, Argentinas Gini has
increased by 25%, while Brazils has fallen by 10%; in South Asia, Bangladeshs
Gini has increased by 60%, while Nepals has decreased by 38% and in East Asia,
Chinas Gini has increased by 39%, while the Republic of Koreas has decreased
by 14%. The latter comparison is an interesting one. China and Korea have both
been extraordinarily successful with respect to growth in mean incomes over the
period studied, yet have had very different experiences with respect to changes in
domestic inequality.
There is an important caveat to the regional patterns just painted. The cover-
age in our sample is typically more limited for the Middle East and North Africa,
and for sub-Saharan Africa. There are also some issues of comparability over
time in these regions in terms of the countries which compose the regional sample
14This is consistent with earlier studies on inequality trends in the Latin American region (see e.g.
Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010; Gasparini et al. 2011; Lustig et al. 2013; Cornia 2014; Szekely and Men-
doza 2015).
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changing over time. See Tables B.1–B.7 in Appendix B for full details of regional
composition and population coverage.
6 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness of Estimates
As in any study on global inequality, there are a multitude of potential sour-
ces of error in our estimates, including sampling error, measurement error and
assuming a single PPP price level for each country. Unfortunately, providing
meaningful confidence intervals is a virtually insurmountable task (see Anand
and Segal, 2008 for the definitive account of these issues). However, recognising
the considerable impact on our overall inequality estimates of India and China,
given both their large populations and dramatic growth performance over the
period, we consider the sensitivity of our estimates to substantial measurement
error in those quantile share data.
Our key findings are that relative global inequality has fallen substantially
during 1975–2010, while absolute and centrist measures of inequality have
increased dramatically. As the analyses in Table 3 and Table 4 indicate, the latter
findings would be most unlikely to change using almost any conceivable quantile
data for India and China; we therefore focus on the former results. Perhaps the
most obvious concern to these findings comes from the possibility that relative
inequality was much lower in India and China in 1975 than our data indicate, and
much higher in 2010 than our data suggest. In our sensitivity analysis we therefore
estimate the Gini coefficient and Coefficient of Variation for a counterfactual sit-
uation where, in 1975, India and China had the same quantile shares as Hungary,
which had among the lowest levels of relative inequality in our sample in 1975,
and the same quantile shares in 2010 as South Africa, which had among the high-
est levels in our sample at that time. All other countries are assumed to have the
same quantile shares as in our main analysis. The results are presented in Table 6.
As expected, a comparison of the Gini coefficient and Coefficient of Varia-
tion estimates to those in Table 2 indicates lower inequality in 1975, and higher
inequality in 2010, than in our main analysis. However, the direction of change is
not affected: relative inequality has still fallen according to both the Gini and CV,
from 0.735 to 0.691, and from 1.898 to 1.810, respectively. To put the sensitivity
analysis in context, the scenario just computed is tantamount to assuming mea-
surement error so high that Chinas and Indias Gini coefficients in 2010 were
TABLE 6
Sensitivity Analysis: Relative global inequality levels assuming extreme measurement error
in India’s and China’s quantile data
Inequality Measure 1975 2010
Coeff. Of Variation (CV) 1.898 1.810
Standard Deviation (SD) 10178.15 19217.43
Krtscha (K) 19320.081 34780.288
Gini (G) 0.735 0.691
Absolute Gini (AG) 3943.179 7334.207
Intermediate Gini (IG) 2899.774 5065.810
Source: Authors, based on the World Income Inequality Database.
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incorrectly measured as 0.398 and 0.417, respectively, when they should actually
have been 0.696. Furthermore, they were incorrectly measured in 1975 as 0.287
and 0.412, respectively, when they should actually have been 0.226. Overall, the
sensitivity analysis strongly suggests that the main findings regarding inequality
trends are robust to imprecise measurement of Chinas and Indias income
distributions.
7 Conclusion
Using the most up-to-date and reliable dataset of worldwide distributional
data presently available, we have estimated global interpersonal inequality levels
and their trends during the period from 1975 to 2010. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the most comprehensive study on global inequality to employ a range
of inequality measures with very contrasting normative underpinnings; relative,
absolute and centrist. Taken together, the results in the paper echo Atkinson
and Brandolini (2010) in emphasising just how central the choice of measure is to
any discussion of what has happened to global inequality levels during recent dec-
ades. As highlighted above, constructing a global distribution of income upon
which to base inequality estimates, is inevitably subject to many kinds of chal-
lenges. Yet whatever errors may remain in constructed distributions such as ours
and those of other authors, the resulting error in, say the Gini coefficient, is noth-
ing compared to the differing conclusions reached about what has happened to
inequality in moving even to a centrist measure such as the Krtscha, let alone an
absolute one.
According to our results, relative global inequality, as captured by the Gini
coefficient and Coefficient of Variation, while still staggeringly high, has fallen
quite substantially over the decades. This has been driven by a dramatic decline in
relative inequality between countries, largely arising from Indias and Chinas
outstanding growth performances. In stark contrast, we find that absolute global
inequality, measured by the Standard Deviation and Absolute Gini, rocketed dur-
ing 1975 to 2010. Moreover, even our two centrist measures, an intermediate Gini
and the Krtscha, one of the most intermediate of the centrist measures, deem
global inequality to have been considerably higher in 2010 than in 1975.
What should policymakers with a concern for global inequality take from
these apparently disparate findings? The evidence from experimental work on polit-
ical philosophy and redistributive justice suggests that people do have diverse views
about what exactly consitutes fair redistribution. Perceptions of inequality may be
likely related to increasingly obvious absolute differences in income, not only to the
perhaps less apparent relative differences, which have been in focus in empirical
studies in the Economics literature. Income differences are increasingly obvious to
people both because they have become so large, and because of the increased
awareness globalisation has brought of life in far-flung corners of the globe. One
notable implication of our findings for those with a concern for global inequality is
the important role which continued convergence in global incomes must play. As in
previous studies, our evidence suggests that declining relative inequality between
countries has been the main, if not only, factor in reducing global relative
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inequality. Yet insufficient convergence, together with substantial growth in per cap-
ita incomes, has meant that the increased absolute differences in mean incomes
between countries have resulted in increased absolute (and even some centrist)
notions of global interpersonal inequality, regardless of domestic inequality levels.
The other method for reducing global inequality is, of course, reducing
inequality within individual countries. Our analysis found that if all countries
could attain Nordic levels of relative inequality, at least some centrist indicators
would suggest similar inequality levels as forty years ago.
There is, in our view, a possible danger, in giving more absolute indicators of
inequality too much focus, especially in poor countries - even if ones normative
judgement is that absolute measures capture the essence of inequality better than
relative ones. During the timeframe analysed, millions of people around the world
have been lifted out of absolute notions of poverty, driven largely by dramatic
growth in India and China. This growth has been accompanied by a striking rise
in absolute inequality in those countries, no doubt, but it has transformed count-
less lives. Whether such growth, and such poverty reduction could have occurred
without any increase in inequality, at least in its absolute form, is surely a highly
moot point.
In the end, one interpretation of our results might be that, for better or for
worse, a degree of increased inequality, at least in its absolute form, is an inevita-
ble by-product of economic progress. This would rather echo the findings of
Ravallion (2004), who showed that the absolute gap between the rich and the
poor rises in growing economies while falls in contracting ones. There would be
huge implications for the fight against global absolute poverty if attempts were
made to halt or reverse economic growth in order to appease absolute inequality.
In fact, Ravallion (2005) has shown that declining absolute inequality is associ-
ated with a rise in absolute poverty. There is, however, increasing evidence that
lowering high levels of relative inequality may not only be desirable in its own
right but may also be growth promoting. Policies aimed at reducing high levels of
relative inequality may have multiple benefits. In the short-run, redistributive poli-
cies are an obvious channel to achieve this. In the longer run, devoting greater
resources to the promotion of human capital, especially, as Heckman (2013) and
others have recently convincingly argued, in early childhood, and especially
among disadvantaged children, is perhaps an even more potent tool.
The conflicting results from relative versus absolute measures of inequality
highlight the importance of having a more open discussion about the implications
of normative notions of inequality when setting global developmental agendas
such as the sustainable development goals. What scenario would be more desira-
ble: i) a society that enjoys high average incomes with no absolute poverty, but
suffers from high absolute inequality, or ii) a society that has low average incomes
and high levels of absolute poverty, but with more contained absolute inequality?
These questions bring us to the point on which we wish to conclude. All too
often people on lower incomes suffer from lack of attainment across multiple
domains. Progress, with or without increased income inequality, is not real pro-
gress if improvements are not also apparent in non-income domains, be they peo-
ples health, education, life satisfaction, or, as Sen (1979, 1985, 1999) has
forcefully argued, the freedom to live the kind of life one has reason to value.
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Monetary outcomes are only one facet of wellbeing. In our view, a key challenge
for policymakers is to employ a dashboard of indicators to assess progress and, to
whatever extent income inequality, relative or absolute, is unavoidable, policy-
makers should do all they can to minimise its replication in other domains, by
promoting equality of opportunities.
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